Communist Party

Conclusion

To assess the factors behind the banning of the factions and dissidence inside the party, we looked in the previous chapters at five possible reasons for the Bolsheviks (and Lenin in particular) to issue the two discussed resolutions: the factions and divides in the CPSU itself, the peasant risings, the workers’ strikes, the Kronstadt revolt and finally the influence of the party itself and Lenin in particular.

        Of these five possible factors, one is directly linked to the two resolu­tions: the factions inside the party.  We found that these factions were, certainly at a later stage, a serious threat to communist rule.  The divides inside the party were at that time so profound and broad (frictions occurred over War Communism, militarization, party demo­cracy, etc.) that governance by the party and even the Central Committee was blocked by them.  Of course one can argue that such divides and factions are a normal feature of political parties and politics more generally.

        In this sense the two resolutions can be regarded as redundant - or maybe as a logi-cal consequence of Bolshe­vik and especially Leninist ideology, if we take this factor into account.  Indeed we could find a certain path-dependence towards internal dictatorship.  A major role was played by Lenin, but he was certainly not the only one who decided to develop a May Programme (in 1918 already).

        If we, however, look at the circumstances under which the resolutions were taken, they do not seem redundant at all; nor does ideology constitutes such a major factor as certain authors put forward.  Confronted by opposition from practically all sides in society, the Bol­sheviki had to restore their governing power.  The only way to do this was to press for more unity in the party so that decisions could be taken powerfully and quickly.  In our opinion this was the only way to cope with the revolutionary situation in the beginning of the 1920s.

        Nearly all literature we consulted, points out to the fact that the situation at that time was indeed revolutionary.  At a later stage of the events, all three movements who pressed for the suppression of Bolshevik rule, became mass movements with clear political goals besides the economic demands that started the revolts (the excep­tion here is maybe Kronstadt, which can be seen as a consequence of the workers’ and peasants’ risings).

        Two major dimensions can thus be observed behind all these events: a political and an economical dimension.  On both sides the Communist rule was under severe threat.  There had to be done something to cope with the political and economical crises.  As this paper only focusses on the first dimension of the events, we can only state that the two resolutions were a logical consequence; further wavering and divide inside the party would have meant the end of all authority and the break-up of Russia, which would maybe endure in several years of anarchy then.  The two resolutions in a way also helped Lenin to start the retreat of the state in the economics: NEP[1], which was the answer of Lenin and Bolshevism to the economical dimension of the crises.

         Our conclusion could be as follows.  There is only one direct factor behind the two resolutions: the dissident and factions inside the party.  If there was no other opposition besides the internal opposition, a banning could still have quite easily occur­red because the governance and rule of the Bolsheviki were blocked - and of course because of the path dependence towards internal dictatorship.

        But by no means the banning of the factions occurred at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 by accidence or under influence of a path dependency alone: at that time there was severe political opposition to Communist rule from three sides.  The very important relationship with the peasantry had never been worse; the even more important relationship with the proletariat virtually ceased to exist; and one of the most important strongholds of dictatorial rule, the army, revolted.

        All the events of the 1920s and their consequences, could not have been described better and more compact than Lenin did, when he in 1921 wrote in his notes for a speech to the X Party Congress:

 “The lesson of Kronstadt: in politics - the closing of the ranks (+ discipline) within the party, greater struggle against the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutio­naries; in economics - to satisfy as far as possible the middle peasantry”^[2].

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